ABSTRACT Questionnaire surveys undertaken in 1988 and annually from 2003 through 2014 of recent homebuyers in each of four U.S. metropolitan areas shed light on their expectations and reasons for buying during the recent housing boom and subsequent collapse. They also provide insight into the reasons for the housing crisis that initiated the current financial malaise. We find that homebuyers were generally well informed, and that their short-run expectations if anything underreacted to the year-to-year change in actual home prices. More of the root causes of the housing bubble can be seen in their long-term (10-year) home price expectations, which reached abnormally high levels relative to mortgage rates at the peak of the boom and have declined sharply since. The downward turning point, around 2005, of the long boom that preceded the crisis was associated with changing public understanding of speculative bubbles.
INTRODUCTION
Between the end of World War II and the early 2000s, the U.S. housing market contributed much to the strength of the macroeconomy. It was a major source of jobs, produced consistently rising home equity, and served as perhaps the most significant channel from monetary policy to the real economy.
But starting with a drop in the S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Index for Boston in September 2005, home prices began to fall in city after city. By the time the slump was over, prices were down almost 32 percent on a national basis, with many cities down by more than 50 percent, wiping nearly $7 trillion in equity off household balance sheets. The production of new homes and apartments, as measured by housing starts, peaked in January 2006 at 2.27 million on an annual basis. Starts then fell 79 percent, to fewer than 500,000, in just 2 years. From October 2008 until September 2012-a stretch of 48 months-starts remained below a seasonally adjusted annualized rate of 800,000 units, a 50-year-low. While starts have improved, they have hovered near one million units as of this update in 2014, far below the historic average of 1.5 million units.
As prices fell, the mortgage industry collapsed and the entire financial system was shaken to its core. Even mortgages and mortgage-backed securities that had been well underwritten went into default. Very high rates of default and foreclosure sent Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two main government-sponsored enterprises in the housing finance industry, into receivership and led to the failure of the investment banks Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns in 2008. The economy went into a severe recession in the fourth quarter of 2007. A similar pattern infected housing markets around the world, including parts of the euro zone and China.
What do we know and what do we need to know about the forces that led to this huge failure of such a large market? The literature on the housing boom and bust of the 2000s is extensive and has identified several potential culprits: a growing complacency of lenders in the face of declining loan quality (Mian and Sufi 2009, Demyanyk and van Hemert 2011) ; money illusion on the part of homebuyers that led to flawed comparisons of home purchase prices with rents (Brunnermeier and Julliard 2008 , along lines exposited by Modigliani and Cohn 1979 for the stock market); an agency problem afflicting the credit rating agencies (Mathis, McAndrews, and Rochet 2009); and government failure to regulate an emerging shadow banking system (Gorton 2010 ). Most if not all of these certainly contributed, even if their relative importance remains unknown. But one thing that is known is that what happens in the housing market depends on the behavior and attitudes of millions of individual participants, and foremost among them are homebuyers.
We believe that one aspect of this episode has not received the attention that it deserves: the role of homebuyers' expectations. What were people thinking when they bought a home? At the time of purchase, a buyer of a capital asset is buying a flow of services and benefits that will all come in the future, and the future is always uncertain. Buying a home means making a series of very difficult decisions that will in all likelihood affect the buyers' lives forever. Anyone who has ever signed an offer sheet, read a building inspector's report, or written a down payment check, and wondered what would happen if she lost her job or fell seriously ill, knows that these decisions are emotional, personal, and difficult. The title of this paper focuses on this process of thinking about the future that homebuyers go through-calculating subjective costs, weighing risks and one's own tolerance for risk, formulating and trading off among preferences-all difficult topics for economists. Understanding the housing market is really about understanding what goes on in the minds of buyers, and we chose to go directly to the source. This paper reports and analyzes results of a series of surveys that we have conducted since 1988 of homebuyers in four metropolitan areas nationwide. We begin with a description of the survey, of the questionnaire itself, and of the sample sizes. The bulk of the paper then asks and attempts to answer, using the survey data, a number of questions that, we think, will add to our understanding of how the housing market works: The choice of questions is constrained by the nature of the data, and the methodologies we use to answer them are simple and somewhat ad hoc, given that we lack a theoretical framework for our analysis. The roughly 5,600 respondents had one thing in common: they had purchased a home recently. Rather than look only at their actual behavior, we chose to ask about their perceptions, interpretations, and opinions. We singled out recent homebuyers in order to focus on the opinions of people who were actively involved in the process that determines home prices.
We wanted to see how these opinions change through time. We cannot, however, assume that their responses describe the opinions of the great mass of people who were not actively participating in the housing market during this period.
I. Our Survey of Homebuyers
More than two decades ago, to gain a better understanding of the role of psychology and expectations in the housing market, we decided to survey a sample of homebuyers and ask them specifically about their reasons for buying. That survey, mailed in the late spring of 1988, consisted of a questionnaire of approximately 10 pages, which we sent to a random sample of 500 homebuyers in each of four locations within metropolitan areas around the country: The questionnaires were identical (except for names of the local areas) across the four survey locations. Participation was limited to people who had actually closed on a home that spring. In a typical year, only about 5 percent of the nationwide housing stock changes hands. Thus, our respondents do not necessarily represent the universe of homeowners, home seekers, or home sellers. Yet these are the people on whom we based our implicit valuation of the entire stock.
The response rate to that first survey was extraordinary: of 2,030 surveys mailed, 886, or 43.6 percent, were ultimately completed and tabulated. Case and Shiller (1988) presented the results of that survey and concluded, "While the evidence is circumstantial, and we can only offer conjectures, we see a market largely driven by expectations. People seem to form their expectations from past price movements rather than having any knowledge of fundamentals.
This means that housing price booms will persist as home buyers become destabilizing speculators." In addition, we found significant evidence that housing prices were inflexible downward, at least in the absence of severe and prolonged economic decline.
In 2003 we decided to replicate the survey in the same four counties, to see whether changes in market conditions and other recent history had changed people's views. We have repeated the survey in the spring of each year since then. Except for the addition of some new questions at the end the questionnaire has remained exactly the same in all surveys. We now have completed the process a total of 13 times, and this paper presents a first look at the aggregate results.
The response rate in the 2003 survey was 35.3 percent of 2,000 originally mailed (table 1 shows the response rates for the whole series). The high response rate was in part the result of sending the questionnaire with a letter hand signed by both Case and Shiller, sending a postcard follow-up to nonrespondents, and finally sending a second mailing. When response rates dropped Table 2 compares the actual behavior of home prices in the four metro areas with what our respondents perceived to be happening in their area at the time. For each metro area across all 13 survey years, we calculated the correlation of the actual year-to-year change in the secondquarter average of the local S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Index with the percentage of would expect to see a high positive correlation of the year-over-year price increase with the percentage saying "rising rapidly," and a high but negative correlation with the percentage who said "falling rapidly."
II. Were Homebuyers Aware of Local Price Trends?
The simple correlation coefficients are indeed high in all four locations, and all have the right sign, indicating that respondents' perceptions were largely on target. The correlations weaken, although slowly at first, when one compares current perceptions with price changes in the more distant past (results not reported). Our Boston-area homebuyers, in contrast, saw a great deal of uncertainty in 1988. As figure   1c shows, the local market was at or approaching a peak in that year. It appears that people could not clearly see a trend amid the short-run noise: 37 percent of our Middlesex County respondents said prices were "not changing," while most of the rest were split, with 34 percent saying prices were rising slowly and another 22 percent saying that they were falling slowly (bottom left panel of figure 1 ). Home prices in the Boston area were sticky and indeed essentially flat, but there was a great deal of debate at the time about the likelihood of a recession and an actual price decline.
Home prices in Milwaukee, by contrast, rose more slowly and steadily in the late 1980s (figure 1 d), and our respondents' perceptions reflect that. Like their Boston-area counterparts, few
Milwaukee County respondents saw prices moving rapidly in either direction: 53 percent perceived prices to be rising slowly, and another 24 percent said prices were not changing.
What we observed in the late 1980s was a set of housing markets behaving very differently and 95 percent thought prices were either flat or falling. In the Boston area 88 percent reported that they thought prices were falling, and 97 percent thought they were flat or falling.
Respondents in Milwaukee County were slightly more optimistic, with 78 percent seeing either flat or falling prices. percent thought prices were rising rapidly. In Middlesex County, 98 percent of respondents perceived prices as rising, while the share in Orange County was 89 percent. In both these counties, however, the majority of respondents thought prices were rising slowly. Respondents in Milwaukee County were again not as optimistic but were realistic. Just 73 percent of respondents thought prices were rising, nearly all of whom thought prices were rising slowly. Another 20 percent thought prices were not changing.
Notice also the answers to the other question reported in figure 1 . When asked whether they agreed with the statement, "It is a good time to buy a home because prices are likely to rise in the future," the vast majority of respondents said yes. In every single survey in every county, the share agreeing with the statement was never less than 67 percent, and in most it was over 80 percent. Buyers are optimists.
III. What Were Homebuyers' Price Expectations for the Short and the Long Term?
Many stories of the housing boom in the early 2000s describe it as a bubble driven by irrational expectations. People are alleged to have been excessively optimistic. Our data allow us to examine such notions, as we began to do in our 2003 Brookings Paper, but now can do even better with the expectations data that our survey provides over the full course of the boom, bubble, and collapse.
Two questions in our survey help us to assess the rationality of buyers' expectations.
Question 6 asks respondents how much they think their home is likely to increase or decrease in value over the next 12 months. Question 7 asks what they think will happen to the value of their home each year over the next 10 years. Table 3 tabulates the answers for every year from 2003 through 2014 One way to think of these results is as the expected value of the average increase in home prices over the next year (the short-run expected annual gain; top panel) and the expected Source: Authors' surveys. a. Means are 10 percent trimmed means; that is, the highest and lowest 5 percent of responses were dropped before calculation the mean.
b. Survey question 6. c. Survey question 7; in the 2012 to 2014 surveys, the words "On average" and "each year" were underlined 2006, just before the peak, it turns out to be a little above 10 percent per year on average for that 10-year period. Indeed, more than half of our city-specific indexes show 10 years of returns averaging in excess of 10 percent per year. This was taking place precisely as the expectations that we are describing in our survey were being formed. In 2013, one year expectations rose above ten year expectations indicating that buyers have become more optimistic about price increases over the short term than in the long haul.
Both kinds of expectations are important. If 1-year expectations are high, home sellers will have an incentive to wait another year to sell, while buyers will have an incentive to buy now rather than next year. But when it comes to the decision of whether to buy at all, and comparing the expected rate of return on the investment with the mortgage rate, the longer-term expectations are likely to be more important. When asked to project how much their home's value would increase or decrease in each of the following 10 years, homebuyers in both locations were more optimistic. But even these expectations were not unreasonable given the performance of the market before 
IV. Were Homebuyers' Expectations Rational and How Were They Formed?
We can test whether the expectations of our homebuyers were rational by regressing actual home price changes on the expected changes. Of course, with our present data set we can do this only for the 1-year expectations, since we have limited 10 years of subsequent price data. The majority of the surveys in each year were returned in the second quarter, so we calculated the Contrary to what one might expect from popular stories about bubble mentality, then, the 1-year expectations of homebuyers were not overreacting to information, but rather underreacting to it.
However, this is not necessarily inconsistent with the presence of a bubble. Certainly, the longerterm expectations, whose rationality is harder to judge, seem likely to have been more in line with information in the early years of our sample when they were predicting appreciation of over 10 percent a year for the next 10 years. slightly higher in the regressions using the FHFA data, they still are not significantly different from 1.
Regression coefficient
We can test the rational expectations hypothesis further by adding to the regression other variables reflecting information available to homebuyers when their expectations were recorded; these other variables should have a coefficient of zero if their expectations were rational. We tried two such variables: the actual lagged 12-month price change in the same metro area and the actual lagged 12-month price change for the United States as a whole, as measured by the S&P/Case-Shiller 10-City Home Price Index. As table 6 reports, both of these variables' coefficients have the opposite of the expected positive sign but are insignificant. This is consistent with the rational expectations hypothesis for the 1-year forecasts: respondents do appear to incorporate this other information in making those forecasts. Table 7 reports results of regressions in which the actual and expected price changes switch sides in the equation and the time lag is reversed: we regress the 1-year expectation on the lagged actual 1-year price change. This allows us to see whether there is a simple structure to expectations. The R 2 s in these regressions are substantial, ranging between 0.65 and 0.87. Of course, the slope coefficient is far less than 1, because as we have noted, expectations are much less volatile than actual price changes.
Thus, the 1-year expectations are fairly well described as attenuated versions of lagged actual 1-year price changes, and yet we know from table 6 that they also contain significant information about future price changes beyond what is contained in the lagged actual price change. This conclusion does not mean, however, that any story of feedback in determining price should be modeled in rational terms. Long-term expectations also matter importantly for demand for housing, because as previously noted, they are important to people's decisions about whether to buy a home at all.
As John Maynard Keynes suggested in his 1936 General Theory of Employment, Interest and
Money, it is long-term expectations that may be the real driver of speculative booms, even though these expectations are not normally the focus of economic forecasters. It may be a general expectation about the vague and distant future that helps explain why people behaved in the 2000s as if they thought that home prices could never fall: perhaps they thought so only about the long run, as our 10-year expectations data seem to confirm. By 2012, as figure 4 shows, long-term expectations had fallen to a level practically equal to the mortgage rate, suggesting that homebuyers were longer perceived a long-term profit opportunity in investing in a home. Now that has changed, though not by much. Long-term expectations for home price increases are rising, but do not put us in bubble territory. Since a sample consisting only of homebuyers is likely to be upwardly biased in terms of expectations relative to the population as a whole, the perceived investment opportunity among the general population may be even lower. A survey of professional forecasters conducted by Pulsenomics LLC suggests that these professionals are less optimistic than our respondents. Their average Why were home price expectations so high relative to interest rates around 2004? Some simple stories come to mind but cannot be proved or disproved with any data that we know of.
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One is that these long-term expectations were formed over many decades during which home prices more or less consistently rose. Another is that money illusion plays a role: people may fail to consider that with lower overall inflation today than in past decades, home price increases are likely to be smaller than in the past.
Notably, the peak in expectations during the 2000s boom occurred 2 years before prices began to fall, 3 years before the beginnings of the subprime crisis, and 4 years before the most intense phase of the crisis in late 2008. This, together with the fact that the decline in expectations is fairly steadily downward between 2004 and 2012, shows that the crisis cannot be the cause. Perhaps that should not be altogether surprising, for the crisis was presented to the public as just that-something short-term. It was associated with an economic recession, and all recessions in recent decades have been short. So perhaps it was not so much the crisis itself as its surprising duration that gradually contributed to bringing expectations further down.
V. How Did the Bubble End?
Our sample period includes two turning points in the housing market, the sudden, historic end of As of 2004, a few professional economists were already responding to the claim of some that the housing market was in a bubble. Our own 2003 Brookings Paper (Case and Shiller 2003) strongly suggested that housing was in a bubble, but others took a different view.
Our questionnaire itself did not use the word "bubble" except in the 2010 survey, when we added the following yes-or-no question:
4 Do you think the home price boom and bust in first decade of the 2000s was basically a speculative bubble and burst (prices driven up by greed and excessive speculation and then inevitably collapsing down)?
3. In this year as in some others, we added one or more questions at the end of the questionnaire, without, however, changing the wording of any of the other questions. improve their homes between sales. However, the only evidence they offered for a widespread change in average home quality was that the overall increase in the OFHEO index in recent years was approximately the same as that of the ordinary median price, which does not attempt to hold quality constant.
In February 2005 David Lereah published his book Are You Missing the Real Estate Boom?
Lereah strongly rejected the mounting suspicion that a real estate bubble was forming. He argued instead that lower interest rates meant that housing was much more affordable than it had been in the previous couple of decades, and that demand from the baby-boom generation would keep the market going strong for years to come. Although he was right about these points, it was still a leap of judgment to conclude, as he did, that the housing market at the time offered a "once-inevery-other generation opportunity" for investors.
In March 2005 one of us (Shiller) published the second edition of his book Irrational Exuberance, which included a new data set on real home prices since 1890. No such long data set of U.S. home prices had ever been published before, and a chart depicting the aggregate series revealed that by historical standards the current real estate boom was highly abnormal, "like a rocket taking off" (Shiller 2005, p. 4) . The chart was reprinted in a number of places, including the New York Times.
On June 16, 2005, the Economist published a cover story titled "After the Fall," with a cover illustration of a falling brick inscribed with the words "house prices." The story said:
Perhaps the best evidence that America's house prices have reached dangerous levels is the fact that house-buying mania has been plastered on the front of virtually every American newspaper and magazine over the past month. Such bubble-talk hardly comes as a surprise to our readers. We have been warning for some time that the price of housing was rising at an alarming rate all around the globe, including in America. Now that others have noticed as well, the day of reckoning is closer at hand. It is not going to be pretty. How the current housing boom ends could decide the course of the entire world economy over the next few years.
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Indeed, it does appear that the news media had by this time flocked to the notion that the housing boom was really a bubble. On June 13, 2005, Time published a cover story titled "Why
We're Going Gaga over Real Estate," with an illustration of a man lovingly hugging a house. A week later Barron's ran a cover story by Jonathan Laing titled "The Bubble's New Home."
Why did all this media attention happen so suddenly? It is hardly controversial to suggest that the major news media are always looking for stories that will resonate with their readers, and that when one of them comes across such a story, the others follow. Somehow the housing bubble story seems to have become such a story around that time, marking a turning point in public thinking. That people were changing their thinking about housing bubbles in mid-2005 can also be measured by a Google Trends count of web searches for the term "housing bubble."
As figure 6 shows, 2005 saw a sudden burst in web searches for this term, peaking in August. But their analysis also shows that all this came to an abrupt end in all areas at about the same time, just before 2006. Even many months after public opinion had begun to turn decisively toward the view that the recent boom in home prices was a bubble, some economists continued to argue that all price increases were justified by fundamentals and that there was no bubble.
In March paper (Shiller 2006) , that whether speculative price changes are "justified" can be answered in many ways and that the issues in financial theory are sufficiently complex that it is hard to be definitive, yet that there were reasons to suspect that the observed price changes were related to swings in public opinion rather than changes in fundamentals. Smith and Smith (2006) is, to our knowledge, the last major paper to argue that there never Our data show too that expectations for future home price increases also rose after 2012, following the same feedback response to actual price increases that we observed in the first version of this paper, as shown for short-term expectations in Table 7 .
VIII. Conclusion
The rise and fall of the housing market during the past decade is one of the most important events in modern economic history. This paper has focused on a factor in that episode that has received little formal analysis: the role of expectations. We have tried to draw some conclusions from a data set of nearly 5,600 completed mail questionnaires collected over the past 27 years from actual homebuyers in four metropolitan areas.
The descriptions of the data and the questions that we ask may seem somewhat ad hoc and arbitrary, but as we noted at the outset, no theoretical framework exists to guide us. However, we
can say a few things in conclusion. First, the data suggest that homebuyers were very much aware of trends in home prices at the time they made their purchase. There is a strong correlation between the respondents' stated perceptions of price trends and actual movements in prices. The data also show that the opinions of homebuyers have varied over time. When price trends are strong, there is little disagreement among respondents. When there is ambiguity, respondents seem, not surprisingly, to have a much less clear picture.
The data also show that homebuyers were, if anything, out in front of the short-term changes that were occurring and that their short-run expectations underreacted to the year-to-year changes in actual home prices. Their long-term expectations were more optimistic across both time and From the beginning of the housing bust in 2006 onward, the spread between the 10 percent and the 50 percent trimmed means averaged just 2 percentage points. Having seen price appreciation begin to slow, people came to realize that perhaps the sky was not the limit and that prices could not rise at double-digit rates in perpetuity. By 2012 the trimmed means were closely aligned, with a difference of less than 1 percentage point.
Market exuberance was not the only reason for high expectations for appreciation. Two other factors that likely influenced expectations were failure to understand the impact of compounding and misinterpretation of the question on long-term expectations. For example, a survey respondent who expects prices to double over the next decade might mistakenly report an expected annual increase of 10 percent. In fact, a compound 10 percent annual increase would bring the price of a $100,000 home to $285,000 over 10 years, not $200,000. Some of those surveyed also appeared to misinterpret the question as the total appreciation over the next 10 years, not the annual rate of appreciation. This is likely the case among those respondents who reported their 10-year annual expected appreciation as 10 times their 1-year expectation.
Questions have been added to the end of the survey questionnaire in the past, and more will likely be added in the future as we continue to assess what important additional information we might garner from respondents. A second long-term expectations question, "How much higher do you expect home prices to be, in percentage terms, in 10 years?" might yield interesting results. However, we would expect to find some apparent inconsistencies between the answers to this question and the answers to the question about expected annual appreciation for 10 years, and we still would not know which question elicited their true 10-year expectation. Most people are not used to making 10-year forecasts and have trouble knowing whether prices might double or triple or anything else. We could ask even more questions about what scenarios and probabilities they consider plausible, but in asking such detailed questions we would run the risk that our questioning was educating them and making them think more clearly about future home prices than they ever had before. As survey pioneer George Katona (1975) stressed, most people have only the vaguest long-term expectations and have to struggle to express them in any quantitative terms. Yet the fundamental problem for economists is that these vague expectations are likely to be extremely important in determining the demand for housing.
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